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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The 1967 edition of Bernard and Orlando's bibliography of behavior 
modification (1967) lists over 860 references to papers which the editors 
maintain "develop or illustrate specific methods of behavior modification 
which were conceived of within some learning theory framework" (p. 1). 
Thus, one might conclude that the validity of the behavior therapy approach 
would not be challenged due to its sheer magnitude. However, this has not 
been the case. Four articles have been published in the Psychological 
Bulletin since May, 1965, which have debated the efficacy of behavior ther­
apy (Breger and McGaugh, 1965; Rachman and Eysenck, 1966; Breger and McGaugh, 
1966; Wiest, 1967). A fifth article (Katahn and Koplin, 1968) examines the 
controversy as a paradigm clash. 
An attempt will be made to reiterate these arguments and counterargu­
ments and show how they have or have not been resolved. The controversy 
centers around three major questions. They are: 1) Are the "laws of learn­
ing" which the behavior therapists claim to use actually accepted by con­
temporary learning theorists? 2) Are the learning models and techniques as 
applied in treatment settings appropriate for understanding and treating 
psychosis and neurosis? 3) Are the studies reported by the behavior thera­
pists sufficiently controlled to offer support for the extremely high im­
provement rates thej behavior therapists report to obtain? The following 
discussion will show that only the final issue remains unresolved. The 
present study deals solely with the likelihood that observers do not bias 
their ratings. 
The controversy began with the 1965 article by Breger and McGaugh. 
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They attack the behavioral modification model as being unscientific because 
the principles upon which it is founded are being questioned in the learn­
ing laboratories. They also question the efficacy of the model as being 
appropriate to treatment of neurosis and maintain that: 1) what the behav­
ior therapists call behavior modification is not different from traditional 
therapy; 2) when behavior therapists employ their techniques they are doing 
so in such a general and undefinable manner that there is little resem­
blance between their behavior and the behavior of the learning technician 
in the laboratory; and 3) the behavior therapists have not produced suffi­
ciently controlled studies to claim success. They suggest the behavior 
modification paradigm should be supplemented or replaced by concepts uti­
lizing plans, strategies, or. other conceptualizations from cognitive 
approaches to learning. 
Rachman and Eysenck deny that a cognitive approach to therapy is fea­
sible and suggest that 
... when Breger and McGaugh have some actual applications to re­
port, or have at least succeeded in showing how the major facts 
of neurotic behavior can be accounted for in terms of their 
scheme, then may be the appropriate time to take issue with the 
'reformulation' (1966, p. 165). 
In the second portion of their paper they; 1) state that Breger and 
McGaugh are not familiar with the literature and support their claim by 
listing specific references to articles that Breger and McGaugh have ex­
cluded from their review; 2) answer the charge that learning laws are non­
existent by reverting to "the data closest to reality" and take à nontheo-
retical stand relying entirely upon demonstrable phenomenon; and 3) support 
the behavior therapists' claim that they employ learning principles by list­
ing references to specific case histories. The issue of experimental 
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control is dealt with by objecting to the sample of studies Breger and 
McGaugh cite and listing references they had not reported. 
In their reply to Rachman and Eysenck, Breger and McGaugh (1966) reit­
erate the three questions asked in the original article, believing that 
Rachman and Eysenck did not satisfactorily answer any of their criticisms. 
They accuse Rachman and Eysenck of ignoring the issues they raised about 
the deficiencies in S-R psychology. They point out that many of the tech­
niques which were supposed to have been developed from S-R learning theory 
were, as a matter of fact, in existence prior to the development of S-R 
psychology. The references given in the Rachman and Eysenck rejoinder to 
the criticism of poor control are reviewed. Breger and McGaugh conclude 
"that our original criticisms are still fully applicable" (1966, p. 171). 
On the issue of the learning model they again attack the S-R learning 
model and propose that its deficiencies can be overcome only by the addi­
tion of some form of cognitive processes» They specifically argue against 
the generality of learning and the appropriateness of the law of effect. 
They further maintain that peripheral or S-R psychology cannot explain the 
equivalence of responses and the adaptive application of behavior in novel 
situations without turning to a mediational concept or cognitive notions 
such as strategy, hypothesis testing, or plans. It is pointed out that the 
results of the perceptual consistency, stimulus equivalence, response equiv­
alence, and transposition controversies are evidence that the effective 
stimulus is clearly more "central" than "receptor". The response equiva­
lence and place versus response learning data are interpreted as suggesting 
that the organism is learning what needs to be done in order to achieve 
some final event rather than learning a specific sequence of mechanical 
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responses consisting of a stereotyped pattern of muscular contractions. 
Summaries of the latent learning, perceptual consistency, imitation, lan­
guage learning and imprinting studies are quoted as evidence against the 
law of effect. 
The Hullian notion that drive reduction is necessary for learning to 
occur is countered by reviewing the latent learning, sensory precondition­
ing, novelty and curiosity motivation, and direct brain stimulation studies. 
As the attack upon the drive reductionist is not applicable to indi­
viduals employing operant techniques, Breger and McGaugh discuss the circu­
larity in the definition of reinforcement. They maintain that such defini­
tions make it impossible to determine if results are dependent upon the 
client's awareness rather than something inherent in the reward. Breger and 
McGaugh suggest that the latent learning and discrimination reversal studies 
refute any suggestion that behavior can be understood when one knows the 
reinforcement history of the organism as they show examples where perform­
ance is not dependent upon reinforcement. 
Rachman and Eysenck defend their position by maintaining that the con­
flicts Breger and McGaugh wrote about were theoretical conflicts and irrele­
vant to the methodology of behavior modification. Such phenomena as acqui­
sition, generalization and extinction are, they maintain, laws of learning. 
It is their contention that the controversies cited are conflicts over 
theory, that no learning theorist would deny statements of behavioral laws 
concerning the effects of reinforcement, extinction, etc., and that laws of 
this type are used by behavior therapists. They suggest that the cognitive 
versus S-R issues, i.e., perceptual consistency and the concept of rein­
forcement, are adequately summarized by Taylor and Papert (1956), Taylor 
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(1962), Mowrer (1960), and Metzner (1961; 1964), and need not be recon­
sidered in their article. 
The second Breger and McGaugh article (1966) asserts that Rachman and 
Eysenck have not answered the criticisms leveled at the adequacy of the 
S-R model in explaining perceptual consistency, language interpretation and 
generation, and response equipotentiality. They claim Rachman and Eysenck 
have avoided the issue by retreating to "findings" from conditioning studies, 
i.e., acquisition, extinction, etc., which are entirely dependent upon the 
conditions under which they were studied and should not be generalized to a 
nonlaboratory setting. They further suggest that there is little similarity 
between the behavior therapist and the learning technician in actual context 
and that it is inconsistent for behavior therapists to make claims of wide­
spread behavioral changes as a result of their treatment while they limit 
their theory to highly specific laboratory conditions. 
In 1967, Wiest published a paper in which he accuses Breger and McGaugh 
of misrepresenting the S-R position and then attacking the obvious falla­
cies inherent in their misrepresentation. His purpose is to clarify the 
misinterpretation and to show that, if interpreted correctly, S-R psycholo­
gy is not faced with many of the deficiencies represented by Breger and 
McGaugh*s criticism. 
He begins with their definition of how a behaviorist defines learning, 
i.e., "The tendency to make a particular response in the presence of a par­
ticular stimulus". He claims the statement is absurd when one considers 
any unconditioned reflex, or the instinctive behavior that the ethologist 
describes as released by sign stimuli. He maintains that the statement is 
not representative of a behavioristic standpoint, but that it does go to 
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"show how easily a straw man can be felled" (1967, p. 215). 
Since Breger and McGaugh had denounced the S-R psychologist for not 
dealing with many of the controversies in the learning laboratory, Wiest 
spends some time explaining that: 
... it is not true ... that any set of observations (e. g . ,  the 
observations referred to by the terms 'transposition', 'latent 
learning', 'response equipotentiality', etc.) implies a particu­
lar theory .... Those phenomenon that cognitive theorists be­
lieve are best explained by a theory with cognitive intervening 
variables or mediating processes can also be conceptualized in 
terms of quite different (noncognitive) theories. It would seem 
advisable, therefore, not to form constructs about some phenome­
non in terms of our own theory and then criticize other scien­
tists for not dealing with our constructs. The only things that 
the other scientist must deal with are publicly observable facts 
... it is not incumbent upon him to deal with our inferences 
(1967, pp. 219-220). 
Wiest points out that in their discussion of reinforcement, Breger and 
McGaugh's choice of the saying, "one man's meat is another man's poison" was 
not valid since "... if the saying were true, man as a social animal, with 
his potlatches and potlucks would have descended from a long line of extinct 
ancestors" (1967, p. 216). On a more serious note he addresses the issue 
that Breger and McGaugh claim the reinforcement theorist professes to be 
able to predict behavior from a knowledge of the reinforcement history. 
Wiest notes that both reinforcement and cognitive theorists make use of an 
organism's reinforcement history in making any predictions, but neither 
claims there are no other determinants of behavior. 
On the issue of discrimination reversal experiments Wiest explains that 
the behavior in question does, in fact, conform to the reinforced contin­
gencies: the organism does change his response when the formerly correct 
response fails to pay off. 
In summary, Wiest's main lines of argument are: 1) Breger and McGaugh 
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are misinformed; 2) cognitive theorists frequently are working within a 
different paradigm than S-R theorists, i.e., one group should not expect 
their opponents to address alien theoretical constructs; 3) Breger and 
McGaugh have tended to label a behavioral phenomenon and then proceed as if 
the label were an explanation of the phenomenon; 4) a large part of the con­
fusion has been created by confusing response and stimulus and then attrib­
uting the confusion to the behavior therapist or the S-R psychologist. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this review is not to debate the issues that have been 
presented but rather to examine the questions raised as a prelude to a 
study that will attempt to evaluate one of the issues. 
If one evaluates the arguments and counterarguments that have been 
raised, it is apparent that in the main part the issue is a carryover from 
the unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable, issues which have prompted the 
mechanistic versus humanistic debates for the past 2000 years. In the fol­
lowing pages the status of the S-R learning theory, the applicability of 
the learning model to psychotherapy, and the lack of controlled studies will 
be discussed. An attempt will be made to reach a conclusion about each. 
Learning theory 
The issue, as outlined by Breger and McGaugh's section on learning 
theory, is not that the techniques of the behavior therapist are inappro­
priate but rather that their claim to using techniques derived from "learn­
ing laws" is unjustified. Their criticisms are; 1) techniques similar to 
behavior modification predated the advent of S-R psychology, i.e., the de­
velopment of behavior therapy is independent of the events which occur in 
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the learning laboratory; and 2) the laws of S-R psychology are debatable 
as laws of learning. 
Breger and McGaugh relate that: 
Pfaundler (1904) and Nye (1930) both describe methods highly simi­
lar to the behavior therapist techniques that were employed be­
fore the advent of S-R psychology and for that matter, circus 
trainers have been using 'operant techniques' for centuries (1966, 
p. 172). 
This is the basis for the argument that what goes on in learning theory has 
contributed little to the development of behavior therapy techniques. 
It would be unreasonable to argue against the obvious conclusion that 
what are called behavior modification practices were present prior to the 
advent of psychology, much less the occurrence of S-R learning theory. How­
ever, one would be well advised to question why the procedures failed to 
find substantial acceptance within the practice of the clinician until the 
area of learning theory had been established. It is begging the issue to 
deny that the conceptual framework from which behavior modification operates 
developed in the learning laboratories simply because there are examples 
where similar techniques were employed before S-R psychology developed. If 
a behavior therapist wishes to maintain that he has developed an idea from 
a learning theory, disproof becomes impossible. 
Weist states that the problems of transposition, latent learning, 
response equipotentiality, etc., are both statements of a particular theory 
and descriptions of empirical findings. He maintains that the scientist is 
required to explain only the empirical findings and not the theoretical con­
struct. 
His second general line of criticism pertains to the idea that the 
valid portions of the Breger and McGaugh attack were limited to concepts 
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which S-R theorists questioned years ago, i.e., the attack upon drive re­
duction, Hull's rg, and the idea that an animal in Pavlovian conditioning 
apparatus is doing more than salivating. It is his belief that if one looks 
at more recent S-R theory, he will find that the criticisms Breger and 
McGaugh list are no longer applicable. 
In addressing the equipotentiality issue, Wiest reminds the reader 
that, "Some time ago. Skinner (1935; 1938) pointed to the generic nature 
of both stimulus and responses, and defined an operant as a class of re­
sponses" (1967, p. 216). 
Rachman and Eysenck's claim that the concepts of acquisition, extinc­
tion, etc., are accepted by psychologists, independent of their theoretical 
orientation is justified. It is the status of the behaviorists* claim to 
laws of learning, not their techniques, which is challenged. Breger and 
McGaugh state this clearly when they say: 
The reference to 'laws of learning' that 'no learning theorist 
of any persuasion would deny' further avoids the issue. What 
Rachman and Eysenck cite are findings from conditioning studies 
which are highly dependent on the conditions under which the ob­
servations are made. Although it may be that no learning theo­
rist would deny that 'reinforced pairings of CS and UCS under 
appropriate conditions produce conditioning', many would deny 
that this finding is a 'law of learning' ... (1966, p. 170). 
However, the accusation that behavior therapists are resorting to ex­
perimental findings and not learning laws will encounter little disagreement. 
Yet it is ironical that a student of learning, regardless of theoretical 
bent, would be willing to chastise a colleague for not having "laws" which 
are agreed upon by all contenders. If Breger and McGaugh's point is that 
the discipline of learning is not ready to deliver the final and undeniable 
statement whereby the study of learning is completed, then total agreement 
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from most psychologists is imminent. If, however, their point is that 
learning psychologists do not have sufficient knowledge to make predictions 
of the outcome of conditioning studies, their argument will not receive 
general approval. The question. Are the behavior therapists' procedures 
based on laws of learning or experimental findings? is academic. The rele­
vant issue is: would the shift of their status from experimental findings 
to laws change the operations of the therapist? The answer is obvious. 
Applicability to psychotherapy 
The argument against the applicability of the behavior modification 
model to psychotherapy has two main points. First, the behavior therapists 
are not following the rigorous procedures of the learning theorist by de­
fining terms. Second, the operations of the behavior therapist are fre­
quently no different from more traditional therapists nor are they consist­
ent with the behaviorists' stated posit!Jn. 
Breger and McGaugh (1965) maintain that in order to make the S-R model 
and techniques applicable to neurosis, it is necessary to define the terms 
in such a general way that they lose their meaning. They write: 
When we look at the way conditioning principles are applied in the 
explanation of more complex phenomena, we see that only a rather 
flimsy analogy bridges the gap between such laboratory defined 
terms as stimulus, response and reinforcement and their referents 
in the case of complex behavior. Thus, while a stimulus may be 
defined as an electric shock or a light of a certain intensity in 
a classical conditioning experiment, Bandura (1951) speaks of the 
'imagination of a scene', or, while a response may consist of 
salivation or a barpress in a conditioning experiment, behavior 
therapists speak of anxiety as a response (1965, p. 333). 
Rachman and Eysenck fail to answer the criticism that the definitions 
are too vague to be admissible to a learning laboratory and revert to using 
quotations from Breger and McGaugh's article showing vagueness. They do 
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not defend the position of the desensitization therapist that imagining the 
items on a hierarchy constitutes a stimulus. 
Wiest answers the question of how the desensitization therapist con­
siders imagination a stimulus by pointing out: 
The statement is misleading because it confuses stimulus and re­
sponse and attributes the confusion to S-R theorists. Imagina­
tion is a form of behavior, not a stimulus (cf. Skinner, 1963) 
(1967, p. 216). 
Hence, the confusion created by Breger and McGaugh is simply another exam­
ple of their creating "straw men". 
Despite Wiest's defense against the quotation used by Breger and Mc­
Gaugh, there are examples of poorly defined terms in the behavior modifica­
tion literature, e.g., "temper tantrum" (Williams, 1965), "eating behavior" 
(Bachrach, Erwin, and Mohr, 1965). The lack of clarity of a definition 
would be related to the reliability of the judgments concerning it and not 
to its adequacy as a construct. More will be said about this in a later 
section. 
Breger and McGaugh complain that behavior therapists act in a way which 
is inconsistent with their position in that they interact with the clients 
much as more traditional therapists do and frequently use "dynamically" 
oriented descriptions of clients and outcomes. Their argument is supported 
by quoting from Rachman's writings. Rachman and Eysenck's answer to this 
is to agree that there is similarity in that a behavior therapist talks to 
the client and attempts to find out what events provoke or maintain the be­
havior and in other ways may do things similar to other therapists. How­
ever, they deny that the use of dynamically oriented descriptions are repre­
sentative of behavior therapists and show that the statements Breger and 
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McGaugh quote in their article are taken out of context and are not repre­
sentative of behavior therapy. 
Wiest adds the criticism that the Breger and McGaugh paper is so vague 
in many of the criticisms about behavior therapists that it fails to make a 
distinction between behavior modifiers and more traditional therapists. He 
maintains the suggestions that behavior therapists account for present be­
havior in terms of generalization and that behavior therapists must posit a 
specific learning situation for each symptom could be criticism of a thera­
pist of any theoretical orientation. 
Both the experimenter and subject behaviors exhibited in behavior thera­
py are different from barpress training in complexity. However, the pro­
cesses of extinction, acquisition, etc., remain. That the complexity of the 
response may vary as one encounters subjects of greater response capacity 
should surprise no one. It appears ludicrous to criticize the behavior 
therapists for applying instructions that save time. After all, their aim 
is to modify maladaptive behavior, not demonstrate that they can use con­
ditioning to produce the same results as instructions but in a much less 
efficient manner. Whether the subjects are employing strategies, labels, 
generative processes or simply performing a conditioned response has no 
bearing upon data concerning frequency of response. The operations which 
result in changes in rate of performance do not themselves change as a re­
sult of the experimenters obtaining answers to the questions asked by the 
cognitive theorist. 
Criticizing an experimenter for employing different forms of reinforce­
ment or different levels of instructions for human than nonhuman subjects 
is not justified. If one examines the Premack principle, a consistency 
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among reinforcers becomes apparent even though the forms of reinforcers 
vary greatly for individual subjects (Premack, 1965). 
Experimental controls 
Much of the bitter ink that has gone into the controversy over the con­
trol issue could have been saved by recognizing that Breger and McGaugh are 
arguing about a theory of neurosis while Rachman and Eysenck are making 
references to techniques. Breger and McGaugh maintain that the claims of 
the behavior therapists are made on poorly controlled studies that are high­
ly subject to sampling bias, observer bias, and lack of control. After re­
viewing the behavior modification literature cited in the reviews of Bandura 
(1961) and Grossberg (1964), it is their contention that only the Lang and 
Lazovik study (1963) demonstrates sufficient control to be considered theo­
retically significant and it deals with normal subjects from which results 
cannot be generalized to a neurotic population. They charge that behavior 
therapists typically select only cases which fit their theory and overlook 
"neurotic depressions, general unhappiness, obsessional disorders, and the 
kinds of persistent interpersonal entanglements that characterize so many 
neurotics" (1965, p. 348). They maintain that this is sampling bias in that 
it eliminates cases requiring a mediation explanation for understanding. 
Observer bias, as used by Breger and McGaugh, occurs when judges are 
not "protected" from their own biases. From their analysis of 26 studies 
in their review, 12 are evaluated by persons other than the experimenter. 
Of these 12, four used hospital staff, four were parents, one a wife, and 
only three used an observer other than the therapist. It is their conten­
tion that "whatever factors enter in to cause observer and reporter biases 
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are allowed full rein in most cases" (1965, p. 352). 
Breger and McGaugh are lenient in their allowances for experimental 
control in psychotherapy experiments, saying. 
Since psychotherapy is not a controlled experiment, it is proba­
bly unfair to expect this type of control. However, there are 
more and less accurate descriptions of what goes on during any 
form of therapy, and we can demand as accurate a description as 
possible in lieu of experimental control (1965, p. 353). 
Their criticism is that the behavior therapists have made no attempt to re­
strict the procedures in behavior therapy to learning techniques. 
As previously mentioned, the argument is not against the techniques 
of the behavior therapists but rather against their claim to techniques 
derived from learning models. The acceptance of the technique is apparent 
in the following quotation: 
While most of these techniques have been superceded by the vari­
ous forms of dynamic psychotherapy, recent work (Frank, 1961) 
suggests that the time may be ripe for taking a fresh look at a 
variety of methods such as hypnosis, suggestion, relaxation, and 
other approaches of a more structured nature in which the thera­
pist takes a more active role. Needless to say, this fresh look 
would best proceed unencumbered by an inadequate learning theory 
and with some minimal concern for control. ... there seems to be 
some evidence that these techniques (as techniques and not as 
learning theory) are effective with certain conditions (1965, p. 354). 
Rachman and Eysenck, who operate from the behaviorist "no theory" posi­
tion, answer these attacks against -what Breger and McGaugh see as the be­
havior therapists theoretical position as though they were against their 
methods (1966, p. 168). Th^  reiterate that the 1965 review of the studies 
done by Breger and McGaugh is based on a survey of all the studies reported 
in two reviews that have appeared (Bandura, 1961; Grossberg, 1964). It is 
their,argument that behavior modification began around 1958-59 and that even 
a 1964 survey of the literature would be deficient as there had not been 
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time to develop and publish research. They then proceed to list references 
which Breger and McGaugh had not reviewed. They conclude: 
The currently available evidence will, we feel certain, convince 
all but the most biased workers that the methods of behavior 
therapy are indeed effective in the modification of neurotic 
behavior (1966, p. 167). 
Rachman and Eysenck (1966) answer the criticism that behavior thera­
pists treat only highly selected cases with specific disorders by referring 
to articles specifying cases which were either selected by someone other 
than the therapist or were suffering from the specific maladies mentioned 
by Breger and McGaugh's criticism. They cite seven articles and a journal, 
founded since 1964, which they believe would have made the criticism of ob­
server bias untenable. To add to the list they cite five references pub­
lished prior to the Breger and McGaugh article which they claim show ade­
quate experimental controls. 
After reviewing the articles suggested by Rachman and Eysenck, Breger 
and McGaugh (1966) maintain that in the Eysenck volume (1964) which was 
listed as a resource for controlled studies, only two of the 42 articles 
are sufficiently controlled. These are the Lang and Lazovik article pre­
viously mentioned and an article by Anker and Walsh (1961) which makes no 
mention of learning theory but rather gives a good example of an innovative 
approach to patient management. The remaining articles listed in the 
Eysenck volume are claimed to show some form of experimenter, observer, or 
sampling bias. The conclusion drawn is that the: 
.o. new references are as subject to bias as those previously 
cited, and the theoretical treatment of issues in the field of 
learning remains naive and misleading (1966, p. 172). 
In a recent review of the literature on desensitization, Paul (1969) 
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reports the results of 75 papers which employed 90 therapists and over 1000 
clients. Of the 75 studies he found: 
... ten reports involved designs which could potentially evaluate 
specific cause-effect relationships between systematic desensiti-
zation therapy and change in client's behavior, although two of 
these ... fail to provide information because of methodological 
problems. Of the latter reports, the work of Lang and his col­
leagues ..., Paul ..., Moore ..., and Davison ... were all suf­
ficiently controlled experimental studies to rule out within-class 
confounding, and all found solid evidence for the specific effec­
tiveness of systematic desensitization (1969, p. 145). 
Unfortunately, Paul (1966), Lang et al. (1966), and Davison (1965) were 
working with college students who could be considered normal. Only the pa­
per by Moore (1965) deals with clinic patients, and these were asthmatic 
patients. Thus, the behavior therapists are still not in a position to 
point to their scientific achievements with neurotic or psychotic clients. 
Three lines of questioning have prevailed throughout the controversy 
examined in this chapter. They are: 1) Are the claims of the behavioral 
psychologist to laws of learning justified? 2) Are the learning model and 
techniques applicable to neurotic and psychotic behavior? and 3) Are the 
studies offered as evidence of the success of behavior modification suffi­
ciently controlled to warrant acceptance as either theoretically valid con­
structs or worthwhile methods? 
It has been shown in the preceding discussion that there are defenses 
from the S-R camp for the theoretical issues raised and that a decision 
differentiating the learning model as based on laws or findings would not 
affect the operations or methods of the behavior therapist. In summary, the 
issue concerning the "laws of learning" as divergent from experimental find­
ings is, for the behaviorist, irrelevant at best and meaningless at worst. 
The arguments raised about the applicability of the behavioral model 
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to psychotherapy have been answered by Wiest as well as Rachman and 
Eysenck. 
What has not been made clear, either here or in the preceding litera­
ture, is that the issue of the applicability of the behavioral techniques 
to treatment must rest on empirical demonstration of the validity of the 
technique. The exchanges have had little meaning if separated from the 
issue of experimental control. If, and only if, the behavior therapists' 
research is valid can the issue be resolved. 
Much of the confusion has resulted from the failure of the opponents 
to see that one is talking about theory while the other speaks of methods. 
This leads to an unresolvable stalemate until the debate over the experi­
mental control issue is resolved. 
The appropriateness of the research reported by the behavior modifiers 
was shown to hinge on the issue of observer bias. There were three general 
criticisms of the literature; 1) The control procedures in an applied 
setting are not rigid. Breger and McGaugh capitulate on this issue as the 
type of control they speak of is simply not feasible with human subjects in 
a theraputic setting. 2) The behavior modification studies are not con­
trolling for sampling bias. 3) The behavior modification studies are open 
to criticism of observer bias. The criticisms are justified. However, in 
view of the number of controlled studies which suffer from the possibility 
of observer bias, but not sampling bias, the relevant issue becomes one of 
observer bias. The present study was carried out to investigate this issue. 
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RATIONALE AND PROCEDURE 
The charge that the behavior modification literature is plagued with 
the possibility that problems of experimenter, observer, or sampling bias 
may have occurred are well founded. Despite the previously cited work of 
Paul (1966), Lang and Lazovik (1963), and Davison (1965), there is doubt 
that any single controlled study shows the effects of behavior change on a 
nonnormal population independent of sampling bias, or rater/observer bias. 
However, the failure to safeguard against the possibility of bias and the 
actual occurrence of bias are separate issues. A failure to safeguard 
against bias does not necessitate the occurrence but simply suggests that 
one cannot definitely say whether or not bias did occur. 
If one examines the three forms of bias more closely, it will become 
apparent that the relevant issue is that of observer bias. On the question 
of experimenter control Breger and McGaugh simply make a case for descrip­
tion of methods rather than control. There are studies in the literature 
which are not subject to sampling bias. However, as Breger and McGaugh 
have shown, these studies have not controlled for observer bias. It would 
seem that the issue of sampling bias would be resolved if one can indicate 
the low feasibility of observer bias having affected these experiments. 
If the criterion used in behavior therapy were shown not to be sus­
ceptible to biasing by the experimenter, hospital staff, etc., the state­
ment, "Whatever factors enter in to cause observer and reporter biases are 
allowed full rein in most cases", and the criticism of these studies based 
upon that statement become important (Breger and McGaugh, 1965, p. 352). 
Behavior therapists predominantly have employed measures which they 
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consider objective. The data are usually reported in terms of increases or 
decreases in the frequency of a response or in shifts on rating scales. If 
one could make the assumption that the count or rating was valid, the 
charge of observer bias loses its effectiveness. If, however, the measures 
are susceptible to bias, the criticism stands to gain strength. 
Goals 
The present study attempted to: 1) determine if observer bias will be 
obtained in a behavioral setting where ratings are done on mental patients, 
2) construct a scale to estimate the approximate range of reliability re­
quired to diminish the influence of rater bias, 3) study an aspect of the 
relationship between rater bias and knowledge of the experimental condi­
tions, and 4) demonstrate a method for assessing observer bias. 
Hypotheses 
Five hypotheses were investigated. They were: 
1. Bias will occur when staff members who have worked with experi­
mental groups rate the members of those groups. 
2. Bias will be limited to items having low reliability. 
3. Bias will not occur when the rater is aware of the possibility 
of bias but unaware of which individuals are involved in each 
treatment group; these conditions will lead to a lack of relia­
bility between raters. 
4. Bias will be prevented and reliability of the ratings will be 
preserved when the raters know the reliability of the items 
employed as well as which subjects are experimental and control. 
5. Bias will not be evident in the highly reliable items; these 
items will not be influenced by any of the conditions of the ex­
periment . 
In order to test these hypotheses it was necessary that raters be 
asked to evaluate or rate subjects who were engaged in a behavior modifica­
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tion project. By providing the raters with behavior checklists composed of 
items of varied but known reliability and manipulating the amount of knowl­
edge about the experiment that raters had available, it was possible to de­
termine whether involvement with the research could influence the ratings 
in the manner suggested by Breger and McGaugh (1965 ; 1966). In order to 
accomplish this, it was necessary to establish a behavior modification 
setting in which ratings were an integral part of an evaluation system used 
on nonnormal subjects who had been involved in a behavior modification pro­
gram. 
Procedure 
Ten individuals from the community resource agencies were asked to ex­
plain the relationship that a veteran might develop in their organizations. 
Each individual made two presentations, one utilizing a role playing or 
practice technique and the other utilizing a more traditional lecture para­
digm. Two staff members were present during each of the presentations. In 
the practice group these staff members served to give feedback or verbal 
reinforcement to the subjects engaged in the role playing. In the lecture 
group they simply observed and on occasion asked questions of the lecturer. 
It was felt that the practice group offered: 1) an opportunity for rein­
forcing the patient as he role played the interviewer and 2) an opportunity 
for social modeling to occur as patients witnessed a member of their group 
interact with the resource person. 
Data would be collected on two separate dimensions. The first data 
were to assess changes in the patient's knowledge about the organization 
represented by the resource person. That is, does the patient learn from 
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the presentation? Second, data were collected and analyzed for changes in 
the patients interviewing skills. 
Ten sessions were scheduled for two groups of patients. The two groups 
met weekly for an hour. They were scheduled to start 30 minutes apart. The 
first 15 minutes of each hour was devoted to obtaining a pre-exposure con­
tent measure. During this time the staff visited informally with the pa­
tients about the topic for the day. At the end of the 15 minute period the 
resource agent was brought into the room and immediately began his presenta­
tion. After 30 minutes if the resource person had not completed his presen­
tation, he was interrupted and left the room. If he had covered the materi­
al in less than the 30 minute period, the remainder of the time was used as 
a question and answer session. The last 15 minutes of the hour was re­
served for the final content questionnaire followed by the staff answering 
questions. During sessions one through five the practice group had the 
first contact with the resource agent. The order was reversed for the 
final five sessions. 
Staff 
The staff directly involved in the training sessions consisted of a 
female occupational therapist, a male chaplain and two male psychology 
trainees. All had approximately seven months of experience in working with 
role playing groups and were practiced in using verbal reinforcement tech­
niques. 
For each training session the four staff members were divided between 
the practice and lecture groups. Two members of the staff would work with 
the resource agent on either the practice or the lecture presentation. 
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Those individuals had from nine months to seven years experience working 
with the patients and were engaged in the study as a portion of their regu­
lar duties. They were assigned to teams in a counterbalanced fashion so 
that each of the four staff members worked with each group an equal number 
of times. 
Patient selection 
Thirty-six patients were originally selected. The criteria for selec­
tion were approval of the hospital staff, including four persons not in­
volved with the experiment, based upon their subjective feeling that; 
1) the patients would not be disturbing to the meetings; 2) the clients 
selected for participation have a reasonable chance of remaining in the 
group for the duration of the experiment, i.e., that there be no plans in 
operation for sending the subject into the labor market or a job training 
setting; and 3) the clients' problems were primarily behavioral and not 
physical (brain damage). As the study was done in an open setting which 
the patients attend by choice, it was mandatory that the clients be willing 
to participate in the meetings. Of the 36 men suggested by the staff mem­
bers a total of 30 were willing to engage in the activity and to take the 
necessary test for evaluation for the project. These individuals were 
listed in the order they were contacted by the staff. From the list they 
were assigned randomly to treatment groups of 15 subjects to each group. 
Of these, two dropped out before the completion of the project. One ob­
tained employment, and one simply found the interaction too threatening and 
ceased to come to the meetings. 
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Patient description 
A survey of the population from which the patients were drawn was con­
ducted six months prior to the onset of this project. It showed the typical 
patient to be a veteran of World War II who served in either the Army or 
the Navy. He had limited job skills (53% unskilled or skilled labor), no 
wife or children, lived in a foster home, and had come from a moderate 
sized community. He had probably been in a mental hospital on more than 
one occasion for a total of seven to eight years of hospitalization. The 
chances were even that he had a guardian, i.e., was declared legally in­
competent. Two diagnostic categories account for 80 percent of the popula­
tion — chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia and paranoid schizophrenia 
(Nord, 1970). It is assumed that the patients selected for the study were 
representative of this population. 
Resource people 
Ten individuals from a variety of professions in the immediate area 
were asked to participate in the project as resource people, or visiting 
lecturer-role playing participants. They were drawn from government agen­
cies, educational institutions, industry and the ministry. 
Training of resource people 
Each of these individuals was given a brief training session in the 
role playing technique. This was typically a rehearsal of their role with 
the chaplain working on the project and usually consisted more of providing 
reassurance that the role playing would be little different than the inter­
action ordinarily expected of their profession. 
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Collection of content data 
Immediately before and after each session with the resource agent the 
veterans filled out a multiple choice test composed of content items which 
would be covered in the resource agent's presentation. The content items 
for the tests were written by the participating staff members. The test 
usually required less than ten minutes for completion. 
Behavior change measures 
On three occasions during the project a simulated job interview was 
staged using the participants from the project: once prior to the assign­
ment of subjects to groups, a second time midway through the project, six 
weeks after the first rating session, and the third time one week following 
the final session with a resource agent. The subject's behavior was rated 
on a zero to nine scale composed of 25 items. The content of the items 
ranged from counting data (The number of questions subjects asked the inter­
viewer) to inferential statements about motivation and ego strength. 
Subjects 
During the rating sessions the staff working with the patient groups 
were joined by four other raters. This provided eight separate ratings for 
each patient interviewed. The eight raters were divided into four groups 
or pairs. 
The first pair consisted of two paid psychological consultants whose 
contact with the project was limited to their ratings. They did not know: 
1) which patients were assigned to the separate treatment groups, 2) the 
purpose of the experiment on comparison of methods, or 3) that their rating 
of patients would serve as comparisons for a study of rater bias. These 
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subjects will be referred to as double blind (BB). 
The second pair, consisting of two Ph.D. counseling psychologists em­
ployed by the hospital but not directly connected with the patients involved 
in the study, knew: 1) that they were rating patients which had been 
trained in either a role playing or lecture group, and 2) that their 
ratings would serve as comparisons in a study of rater bias. They did not 
know which of the patients belonged to the practice or the lecture treat­
ment groups. This pair will be called single blind (B). 
The third pair consisted of two interns who were completing their doc­
torate degrees in psychology. These individuals were aware of all contin­
gencies as they: 1) were involved with both treatment groups, 2) were 
aware that their ratings would be used in a study of experimenter bias, 3) 
knew the reliability of the items used, and 4) had designed both experi­
ments. These raters were considered double wise (WW) as they knew the pur­
pose of the present study and the patients in each treatment group. 
The final pair of raters, the single wise raters (W), was composed of 
a chaplain and an occupational therapist who were under the impression that 
their ratings were to be used to evaluate the comparison of the practice 
and lecture groups' performances. They were further given the information 
that the practice group was showing a superior performance on the content 
measure and were led to believe that if the behavior ratings showed a sig­
nificant difference in favor of the practice group, they would be virtually 
assured of publishing the results. 
26 
The rating scale 
The rating scale consisting of 53 items was written for this study (see 
Appendix I). These items were used by five Drake University students from 
a class in Abnormal Personality to rate simulated job interviews. The stu­
dents playing the roles were coached by one of the psychology interns to 
insure variance in performance between role players. They were then inter­
viewed by the other intern. The raters were allowed five minutes to com­
plete their rating scale before the next simulated interview was begun. 
The inter-rater correlation for each item across the individuals who en­
gaged in the role playing was obtained. From these 25 items were selected 
for the final rating scale (see Appendix II). 
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RESULTS 
The Comparison of the Means 
Had rater bias occurred in the present study, it would be apparent in 
a comparison of the means for the four pairs of raters (BB, B, WW and W). 
These raters, unfamiliar with the patient assignment to treatment groups, 
do not have the information required to bias their ratings. Therefore, the 
blind and double blind raters' mean ratings serve as the basis for compari­
son with the mean ratings from the wise and double wise rater pairs. In­
spection of Figures 1 and 2 clearly shows that the mean ratings for the wise 
and double wise raters lie within the range of the blind and double blind 
raters. This precludes the necessity of testing for significance for ob­
vious reasons. 
Further , inspection of Tables 1 and 2 also indicate it is doubtful that 
there was a systematic effect from knowing that the ratings could be ana­
lyzed for rater bias. No rater pair occupies the same rank position for the 
magnitude of their means on the second and third rating session. If knowl­
edge of patient assignment to group were to introduce some form of bias, it 
would not be expected to reverse itself between the rating sessions. 
Figures 1 and 2 clearly indicate that no rater bias occurred which 
could have affected conclusions based upon the analysis of the data compar­
ing the treatment techniques. Other forms of bias could occur and will be 
discussed in the following pages. 
The Reliability of the Items 
It will be recalled that a 25 item scale was constructed which varied 
greatly in the reliability of the items. Individuals from the patient 
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Wise Blind 
Double wise Double blind 
Figure 1. Mean ratings for rater-pairs on the 2nd evaluation session, Prac­
tice and Lecture groups combined 
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Blind and Double wise 
0| Double blind 
Figure 2. Mean ratings for rater-pairs on the 3rd evaluation session, Prac­
tice and Lecture groups combined 
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Table 1. Reliability estimates 
been omitted) 
for the rating scale items (decimals have 
Item # 
Rating 
Item # 
Ratine 
1 2 & 3^  1 2 & 3 
1 56 58 13 41 - -
2 64 43 14 47 - -
3 42 27 15 23 - -
4 47 54 16 48 45 
5 09 __b 17 29 - -
6 35 49 18 35 44 
7 27 19 19 16 - -
8 20 31 20 20 - -
9 40 39 21 40 36 
10 14 -- 22 51 - -
11 32 -- 23 35 - -
12 30 - - 24 35 30 
25 78 65 
®The correlations for rating sessions 2 and 3 have been averaged to­
gether to provide a single reliability estimate. 
I^tems having zero variance have been omitted. 
population previously described were evaluated by means of this scale on 
three separate occasions as they engaged in a simulated job interview. The 
ratings were done by the eight raters described as subjects. They used a 
nine point Likert scaling procedure. The data were scored and punched on 
data cards by an IBM 1230 optical scanner scoring machine. 
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A correlation matrix was obtained between raters for each item across 
the patients rated on the first rating session. Each correlation is an 
inter-rater reliability, i.e., the correlation of two raters over 22 pa­
tients. The average of these correlations indicates the reliability of the 
items for the eight raters used as subjects in the present study (Nunnally, 
1970). It will be recalled that the patients had not been assigned to 
treatment groups at the time this measure was taken. Therefore, it is 
assured that no observer bias due to treatment groups can be present. The 
reliability estimates are given in column one of Table 1. 
The Reliability of the Items for Rater Pairs 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) suggest that individuals make similar scores 
on a test as a result of either the individuals tested having shared a 
common characteristic (trait) or from something inherent in the process of 
testing (method). They have shown that by forming four possible combina­
tions of correlations it is possible to determine whether the similarity 
among tested individuals is due to methods or traits. By forming groups of 
correlations which share: 1) common methods and traits, 2) common methods 
but different traits, 3) different methods but common traits, and 4) differ­
ent methods and different traits they can isolate the subject similarity 
due either to the traits or the testing methods. The analysis used in this 
study is a modification of their procedure. 
The data collected on the second rating session were correlated across 
the eight raters for the two treatment groups. This resulted in a 16 x 16 
matrix for each item or a total of 25 matrices. Borrowing terminology from 
Campbell and Fiske, one could envision the matrices as composed of two 
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methods and eight traits in which the methods would be the two treatment 
groups and the traits the raters. The average correlation for the portion 
of a matrix corresponding to a monomethod-heterotrait triangle would be the 
reliability estimate for an item for the eight raters within a treatment 
group. The portion corresponding to the heteromethod-heterotrait block re­
sults from the arbitrary pairing of patients in the lecture group with 
patients in the practice group. This portion of the matrix is not relevant 
for the present study. 
The data for the third rating session were correlated in the same fash­
ion, again yielding 25 matrices each having 16 rows and 16 columns. Because 
12 of the matrices generated for the rating sessions contained an item which 
was assigned zero variance by one or more of the raters, there were no cor­
relations for that rater in that group. These matrices were dropped from 
further analysis. 
Three sets of operations were done on the remaining matrices: first, 
the correlation coefficients in the monomethod-heterotrait triangles were 
averaged for each pair of raters, rounded to the nearest five-thousandth, 
and transformed to z* units (see Tables 2 and 3). Six one-way analyses of 
variance were performed on these data (three for each of the two rating 
sessions). Four of these would determine if a rater pair differed signifi­
cantly on the reliability with which they rated the individuals within a 
patient group. The remaining two would show differences in rater pairs 
across groups. No F values approached significance (see Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, and 9) (Edwards, 1960). 
In the second analysis of the matrices all coefficients in the 
monomethod-heterotrait triangles were averaged. These average correlations 
Table 2. Reliability for rater pairs on items having non-zero variance, session 2 (decimals have been 
omitted) 
Practice Group rater pairs^  Lecture Group rater pairs^  
Item # 
B BB WW W B BB WW W 
r z' r  z ' r z' r z' r z' r z' T  z' r z' 
1 62 725 62 733 64 758 62 725 48 517 36 371 50 549 44 466 
25 70 867 69 848 34 354 67 811 40 418 60 693 52 576 54 611 
2 57 655 66 784 60 693 41 442 43 460 35 360 58 662 54 597 
7 -17 172 08 080 09 090 -08 -080 18 182 22 218 29 304 28 288 
8 17 177 22 218 23 234 05 050 09 090 44 472 51 570 55 618 
24 -01 -010 34 354 26 261 14 146 35 360 47 510 51 570 33 337 
9 56 633 45 491 50 549 34 348 16 161 36 377 43 460 23 234 
21 14 136 36 377 40 424 17 172 59 670 70 867 63 791 61 709 
16 58 655 57 640 52 583 45 485 48 523 57 640 42 448 46 504 
3 21 208 33 337 20 198 15 151 46 504 35 365 23 234 35 365 
6 39 412 05 050 39 418 24 239 34 354 12 121 41 442 23 234 
18 35 371 49 536 37 383 03 030 40 430 46 491 22 229 36 383 
% = blind; BB = double blind; WW = double wise; W = wise. 
Table 2. Reliability for rater pairs on items having non-zero variance, session 3 (decimals have been 
omitted) . 
Practice Group rater pairs^  Lecture Group rater pairs& 
B BB WW W B BB WW W 
Item # r z ' F z ' F z' F z ' F z ' F z ' F z ' F z ' 
1 65 767 52 576 67 811 51 563 60 685 68 829 69 898 63 750 
25 63 741 60 701 67 811 54 604 75 973 74 950 68 829 69 848 
2 11 110 28 288 27 277 15 151 61 701 61 709 58 662 61 717 
7 48 523 46 497 13 131 27 277 37 388 04 040 28 288 15 151 
8 47 510 30 310 53 590 57 648 09 090 38 400 25 495 07 070 
24 44 472 28 288 21 213 45 485 36 383 35 365 18 182 09 090 
9 38 400 32 332 52 576 38 400 39 412 56 633 30 310 37 388 
21 53 604 39 412 26 266 49 536 13 131 14 141 20 203 19 203 
16 63 741 66 793 60 693 60 693 20 203 19 192 01 010 17 177 
3 50 549 54 604 14 141 58 406 11 105 00 000 00 005 15 151 
6 35 365 31 321 32 332 43 466 35 365 46 504 43 605 49 536 
18 52 576 40 424 39 412 42 454 64 758 61 717 58 670 59 678 
B^ = blind; BB = double blind; WW = double wise; W = wise. 
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Table 4. Analysis of variance for rater-pair agreement, rating session 2, 
Practice group 
Source Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F 
Between .23 3 .08 1.14 
Within 3.14 44 .07 
Total 3.37 47 
Table 5. Analysis of variance for rater-pair agreement, rating session 2, 
Lecture group 
Source Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F 
Between .06 3 .02 <^ 1.00 
Within 1.43 44 .03 
Total 1.49 47 
Table 6. Analysis of variance for rater-pair agreement, rating session 2, 
Practice and Lecture groups combined 
Source Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F 
Between .42 7 .06 1.20 
Within 4.57 88 .05 
Total 4.99 95 
1 
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Table 7. Analysis of variance for rater-pair agreement, rating session 3, 
Practice group 
Source Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F 
Between .09 3 .03 <^ 1.00 
Within 1,67 44 .04 
Total 1.76 47 
Table 8. Analysis of variance for rater-pair agreement, rating session 3, 
Lecture group 
Source Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F 
Between .06 3 .02 1.00 
Within 4.01 44 .09 
Total 4.07 47 
Table 9. Analysis of variance for rater-pair agreement, rating session 3, 
Practice and Lecture groups combined 
Source Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F 
Between .27 7 .04 <^ 1.00 
Within 5.68 88 .06 
Total 5.95 95 
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were then transformed to z' values and used as data for t-test, i.e., com­
parisons of the means of the 12 triangles. Data from both the second and 
third rating sessions were treated in this fashion to determine if the 
treatment condition to which the patients were assigned could influence the 
reliability with which the patients were rated. Both sets of data yielded 
t values less than one. Table 10 contains these values for each item ex­
pressed in correlation and z* scale units. 
Finally, the correlations for each monomethod-monotrait triangle were 
averaged to yield a single reliability estimate for that item on each of the 
two rating sessions. Column 2 of Table 1 provides these estimates and gives 
an opportunity to compare the reliability estimates when observer bias 
could be present with the estimates obtained prior to patients being as­
signed to groups. It can be seen that no large or systematic shifts re­
sulted. In summary, there is no indication that the pairs of raters differ 
significantly on the reliability with which they use scales either within 
or between treatment groups. 
Rater Preference Within or Between Treatment Groups 
From the scale items nine were selected to represent a continuum of 
reliability. Items 1^  25, and 4 were selected as a high reliability group; 
items 7, 8, and 24 as a low reliability group; and items 9, 16, and 21 were 
selected to compose the medium group. 
Using these three sets of items as methods and the raters as traits, 
six 24 X 24 trait-method matrices were constructed. Three such matrices 
were generated for each rating session; one for each of the two treatment 
methods for each session (Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14) and one for the 
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Table 10. Correlations and z '  values averaged across raters for items 
having non-zero variance (decimals have been omitted) 
2nd Rating Session 3rd Rating Session 
Practice Group Lecture Group Practice Group Lecture Group 
I t e m  # F  z '  r  z *  r  z '  r  z '  
1 63 74 44 47 59 68 49 54 
2 56 63 34 35 20 20 60 69 
3 22 22 35 37 44 47 06 06 
6 27 28 28 29 36 38 43 46 
9 46 63 29 30 40 42 41 44 
16 53 59 48 52 62 72 15 15 
18 31 50 42 45 43 46 61 71 
21 22 22 63 74 42 45 17 17 
24 15 15 41 44 35 36 25 26 
25 75 83 52 58 61 71 72 91 
4 42 45 73 93 45 48 56 63 
7 -02 -02 24 35 33 34 21 21 
8 17 17 40 42 47 51 20 20 
combined groups for each session (Tables 15 and 16). Each correlation with­
in the matrix was the correlation between two raters (or a rater and him­
self) . 
The first four of these matrices would indicate if the individual 
raters were showing preferential ratings for patients within a treatment 
group (Tables 11 to 14). The comparisons made when the treatment groups 
were combined would indicate a rater who was rating patients from one 
Table 11. Trait-method matrix for 2nd rating session. Practice group (decimals have been omitted) 
Reliability 
High& Medium^  Low& 
Raters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8° 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8' 
1 
2 
1 
79 1 
3 74 94 1 
66 86 87 1 
g5 65 74 77 71 1 
® 6 82 89 86 88 73 1 
7 77 91 95 85 73 89 1 
8 77 91 87 89 75 89 86 1 
1 12 14 22 21 11 02 19 02 1 
2 09 20 29 22 35 07 14 14 47 1 
« 3 13 04 21 05 06 04 18 00 54 51 1 
3 4 -13 -11 -05 10 09 00 -05 -03 40 46 48 1 
01 20 33 35 34 16 26 18 62 84 64 70 1 
1 6 16 19 18 15 06 12 19 12 51 31 44 68 44 1 
7 14 30 34 39 30 26 26 24 63 64 41 58 75 54 1 
8 26 11 11 12 08 23 22 13 17 09 27 21 17 43 10 1 
1 -01 10 -03 12 -13 07 02 06 15 -22 -16 -23 -10 -12 02 03 1 
2 -06 -13 -27 -19 04 -08 -28 -06 -24 -24 -17 -08 -29 -18 -22 08 30 1 
 ^3 -02 -17 -25 -13 -25 23 -19 -08 36 -05 35 20 06 24 10 00 17 17 1 
% 4 10 -02 07 -08 -04 -18 02 -02 54 34 68 19 35 36 41 -01 -12 -27 55 1 
,3 5 11 22 10 18 10 11 09 35 30 11 04 08 15 13 34 02 19 23 54 35 1 
6 -07 -16 -17 -22 -07 -22 -12 -18 09 -10 12 -09 -04 -02 -03 -10 22 -17 37 44 17 1 
7 -09 -16 -01 -07 -16 -25 -13 -18 34 15 26 -01 21 05 14 -12 -15 -53 06 52 -02 47 1 
8 -32 -36 -34 -43 -19 -47 -37 -47 18 -18 01 18 -14 35 -10 -13 -16 07 26 11 -17 23 10 1 
w V£> 
&High reliability = items 1, 25, and 4; medium = items 9, 16, and 21; low = items 7, 8, and 24. 
R^aters 1 and 2 = blind; raters 3 and 4 = double blind; raters 5 and 6 = double wise; raters 7 
and 8 = wise. 
Table 12. Trait-method matrix for 2nd rating session. Lecture group (decimals have been omitted) 
Reliability 
High^  Medium^  Low® 
Raters T 2 3 4 5 6 7 8° Î 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  
1 1 
2 49 1 
3 65 88 1 
4 62 81 88 1 
5 70 77 87 80 1 
6 79 61 70 77 68 1 
7 57 88 86 81 86 64 1 
8 63 80 88 83 87 64 81 
1 14 11 01 08 -07 07 11 -03 1 
2 26 -12 -36 -38 -32 -33 -19 -27 61 1 
OS 3 02 -03 -09 -01 -09 -03 01 -12 68 64 1 
3 4 06 32 22 19 18 -02 32 19 52 53 69 1 
5 -08 30 13 08 02 -08 14 09 45 68 69 76 1 
a 6 -34 -04 -19 -10 -17 -27 -05 -15 34 50 75 49 55 1 
7 -07 19 03 04 00 -12 08 07 53 62 65 63 74 66 1 
8 -20 12 -17 -04 -31 -03 -04 08 61 55 56 46 51 54 48 1 
1 25 03 01 25 14 27 09 03 -25 -47 -23 -35 -43 -24 -35 -23 1 
2 -05 01 -03 15 08 10 06 -05 -10 -13 11 10 06 12 02 -06 04 1 
3 -28 -54 -40 -41 -25 -34 -40 -39 -10 -04 08 -39 -29 01 -29 -32 14 -06 1 
§ 4 12 -29 -13 —06 -03 08 -10 -16 20 04 21 -20 -08 -08 03 -31 14 00 65 1 
5 -08 -07 00 02 17 -10 07 07 -20 -29 -18 -28 -31 -20 -15 -42 34 01 64 60 1 
6 23 -14 03 04 37 09 06 15 -25 -33 -12 -39 -41 -22 -37 -56 31 15 64 48 62 
7 11 02 10 02 24 12 17 06 03 -11 08 -32 -16 -09 -11 -34 11 01 68 68 68 
8 08 -29 -04 -11 03 -25 -13 -13 -14 -33 -15 -43 -43 -36 -46 -50 13 -05 80 67 71 
O 
1 
71 1 
61 67 
H^igh reliability = items 1, 25, and 4; medium = items 9, 16, and 21; low = items 7, 8, and 24. 
^Raters 1 and 2 = blind; raters 3 and 4 = double blind; raters 5 and 6 = double wise; raters 7 
and 8 = wise. 
Table 13. Trait-method matrix for 3rd ratine session. Practice group (decimals have been omitted) 
— — Reliability 
High® Medium® Low® 
Raters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  
1 1 
2 89 1 
3 89 81 1 
4 79 84 60 1 
5 86 75 90 64 1 
6 95 89 94 77 93 1 
7 92 86 91 75 85 93 
8 91 81 78 74 85 88 
1 37 31 48 39 41 46 47 44 1 
2 10 04 27 -13 18 12 22 11 67 1 
3 -50 -35 -36 -31 -28 -36 -41 -28 34 21 1 
4 -41 -41 -33 -30 -29 -32 -28 -24 46 50 64 1 
5 03 08 24 -02 23 13 20 17 62 54 55 59 1 
6 35 21 40 22 34 34 34 36 68 67 05 26 43 1 
7 34 40 47 38 39 41 49 33 72 52 33 30 62 50 
8 20 11 34 10 20 23 35 19 76 81 19 65 54 57 
1 -31 -45 -21 -37 -25 -26 -33 -34 -21 -23 00 -21 -37 -16 -27 -35 1 
2 -07 -21 -04 -21 -06 -08 -12 -20 -41 -28 -31 -50 -61 -27 -52 -50 74 1 
3 09 -06 09 02 10 07 10 -06 -27 -20 -24 -25 -33 -21 -21 -14 47 70 1 
4 -13 -16 -06 -13 -06 -10 -19 -19 -15 -17 08 -22 -15 03 -33 -37 56 68 58 1 
5 -47 -45 -42 -33 -39 -46 -39 -48 -27 -11 30 -01 -15 -20 -05 -22 62 47 46 54 1 
6 -16 -26 -15 -08 -05 -11 -12 -10 -15 -13 07 03 -07 -17 15 -03 30 01 21 25 28 1 
7 -05 -02 -02 02 10 03 06 -13 -22 -15 07 -20 -11 -27 19 -23 30 25 30 15 39 46 1 
8 -38 -36 -40 -34 -37 -41 -37 -53 -59 -24 -04 -15 -44 -35 -35 -36 31 52 45 38 67 23 41 
®High reliability = items 1, 25, and 4; medium = items 9, 16, and 21; low = items 7, 8, and 24. 
^Raters 1 and 2 = blind; raters 3 and 4 = double blind ; raters 5 and 6 = double wise; raters 7 
and 8 = wise. 
Table 14. Trait-method matrix for 3rd rating session. Lecture group (decimals have been omitted) 
Reliability 
High® Medium® Low® 
Raters I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8° I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8*' 
M 
* 
•H 
'd 
<u 
1 i 
2 90 1 
3 94 87 1 
4 48 66 57 1 
5 88 91 88 70 1 
6 91 87 91 65 89 1 
7 59 64 50 35 51 58 1 
8 88 86 84 66 90 93 57 1 
1 16 20 05 -21 -07 10 36 07 1 
2 32 37 33 03 15 31 54 33 62 1 
3 -10 01 -07 03 -05 -22 -01 -03 -23 25 
4 -02 08 09 14 03 -05 00 10 -18 19 60 1 
5 12 17 15 10 04 21 29 28 26 51 42 25 1 
6 59 51 45 11 52 39 62 47 26 32 08 -06 -02 1 
7 17 13 04 00 02 04 39 07 40 27 13 -13 13 34 
8 20 19 19 -11 06 19 43 26 53 85 25 17 51 15 
5 
1 -07 -15 11 07 -05 -07 -56 -12 -36 -29 -12 19 -13 -43 -28 -23 1 
2 -25 -32 -14 -34 -29 -27 -16 -24 -21 19 24 19 28 -10 -13 09 45 1 
3 -55 -50 -57 -49 -58 -60 -11 -54 18 27 23 -16 -16 -06 -02 32 -28 37 1 
4 24 22 17 -01 14 10 45 05 33 32 -27 -47 -47 51 27 22 -37 -15 37 1 
5 -61 -49 -48 -34 -56 -60 -41 -61 -04 15 31 08 08 -47 -12 19 33 56 56 -09 1 
6 -06 02 03 09 04 -18 -19 -04 -22 18. 62 14 14 05 -05 10 17 43 25 -02 59 1 
7 -52 -53 -49 -30 -49 -59 -14 -47 02 -06 02 06 06 -15 27 18 14 17 34 21 37 04 1 
8 -47 -37 -32 00 -23 -24 -28 -29 -20 05 11 -05 -06 -30 -47 01 07 45 38 -18 50 32 06 
®High reliability = items 1, 25, and 4; medium - items 9, 16, and 21; low = items 7, 8, and 24. 
^Raters 1 and 2 = blind; raters 3 and 4 = double blind; raters 5 and 6 = double wise; raters 7 
and 8 = wise. 
Table 15. Trait-method matrix for 2nd rating session, Practice and Lecture groups combined (decimals 
have been omitted) 
Reliability 
Hieh& Medium^  Low^  
Raters Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8° Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8° Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  
1 1 
2 66 1 
3 68 91 1 
4 64 84 87 1 
5 67 75 79 75 1 
6 81 77 79 83 71 1 
7 67 90 91 83 78 78 
8 70 86 85 86 80 77 
1 11 13 15 16 04 03 16 -01 1 
2 -05 05 00 -06 05 -10 -02 -07 51 1 
3 10 00 05 02 00 02 09 -05 57 58 1 
4 -09 09 09 13 10 -03 13 06 45 46 53 1 
5 -03 24 25 24 20 06 21 14 55 76 65 70 1 
6 02 10 03 05 -01 00 09 02 42 39 57 50 46 1 
7 09 25 19 24 19 12 17 17 56 63 53 52 73 60 
8 08 12 -03 05 -09 12 09 03 32 33 44 27 32 48 
1 08 07 00 17 -03 14 05 04 01 -34 -21 -25 -24 -19 -16 11 1 
2 02 -06 18 -02 09 03 -11 -03 -20 -13 04 -10 -17 04 -03 08 10 1 
(4 3 -16 -36 30 -27 -25 -28 -29 -26 15 -05 17 -09 -12 10 -12 -20 16 -02 1 
4 08 -12 02 -07 -06 -09 -02 -09 43 19 41 07 19 16 22 -17 01 -02 59 1 
5 02 10 07 11 12 02 08 22 13 -08 -08 -05 -03 -01 12 -20 26 07 58 45 1 
6 07 -15 -09 -11 13 -08 -05 -01 -05 -20 01 -25 -20 -08 -16 -31 25 03 49 43 35 1 
7 -03 -07 -06 -02 01 -09 02 -07 22 00 13 -11 04 -05 -02 -26 00 -29 43 60 32 55 1 
8 -12 -32 -18 -26 -07 -23 -24 -28 03 -26 -08 -16 -28 01 -28 -34 00 00 59 38 28 43 41 
H^igh reliability = items 1, 25, and 4; medium = items 9, 16, and 21; low = items 7, 8, and 24. 
^Raters 1 and 2 = blind; raters 3 and 4 = double blind; raters 5 and 6 = double wise; raters 7 
and 8 = wise. 
Table 16. Trait-method matrix for 3rd rating session. Practice and Lecture groups combined (decimals 
have been omitted) 
Reliability 
High^  Medium® Low® 
Raters I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8^  
1 1 
2 90 1 
% 
w 
3 91 84 1 
4 63 74 58 1 
5 86 82 86 68 1 
6 91 86 90 70 91 1 
7 75 74 71 56 66 75 1 
8 89 83 80 69 87 90 67 
1 24 25 26 03 07 19 33 22 1 
2 20 16 30 -06 15 21 36 23 63 1 
3 -29 -17 -22 -10 -10 -22 -15 -14 -05 21 1 
4 -24 -19 -15 -12 -15 -21 -18 -07 20 36 53 1 
5 07 13 19 02 08 13 19 23 46 52 40 44 1 
6 38 29 38 11 29 25 32 35 55 51 -05 21 30 1 
7 24 27 27 16 12 17 39 19 58 40 17 13 39 46 1 
8 20 14 28 01 13 21 39 22 59 82 23 43 54 37 47 
1 -19 -31 -07 -22 -13 -15 -44 -22 -28 -26 -05 -04 -25 -24 -27 -29 1 
2 -13 -23 -07 -26 -16 -16 -15 -20 -25 -10 -15 -25 -22 -16 -33 -31 60 1 
3 -20 -26 -20 -20 -24 -25 02 -30 -08 01 02 -23 -01 -19 -14 07 12 55 1 
4 07 04 05 -05 08 04 17 -05 07 08 -06 -36 24 13 -03 -07 07 31 47 1 
5 -54 -47 -44 -34 -48 -53 -41 -54 -13 01 28 04 -02 -24 -07 -04 48 49 49 20 1 
6 -12 -12 -07 00 -01 -15 -17 -07 -16 02 30 09 06 -06 06 02 23 15 22 -14 42 1 
7 -26 -24 -21 -14 -21 -28 -05 -29 -07 -10 01 -07 -09 -17 24 -07 22 24 30 16 39 28 1 
8 -42 -37 -37 -17 -28 -30 -31 -40 -40 -11 05 -12 -12 -33 -41 -19 20 46 42 11 59 27 25 
®High reliability = items 1, 25, and 4; medium = items 9, 16, and 21; low = items 7, 8, and 24. 
^Raters 1 and 2 = blind; raters 3 and 4 = double blind; raters 5 and 6 = double wise; raters 7 
and 8 = wise. 
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treatment group more favorably than patients from the other (Tables 15 and 
16) .  
These matrices were then analyzed using a procedure based on Campbell 
and Fiske's method. The requirement from Campbell and Fiske that the values 
in the validity diagonals be non-zero was dropped as the purposeful use of 
items having near zero reliability coefficients predetermined that values 
in the validity diagonal would be near zero. Trait-discrimination would be 
defined by a value in the validity diagonal exceeding the values within its 
row and column and also exceeding the values of the other raters within that 
method. 
The data for all matrices clearly indicate that methods (items) and 
not traits (raters) contributed to the variance, i.e., there is no indica­
tion of discriminant validity. Stated simply, the individual raters do not 
show preferential ratings for either individuals or groups. 
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DISCUSSION 
Five hypotheses were to have been investigated in the present study. 
They were: 
1. Bias will occur when staff members who have worked with experi­
mental groups rate the members of those groups. 
2. Bias will be limited to items having low reliability. 
3. Bias will not occur when the rater is aware of the possibility 
of bias but unaware of which individuals are involved in each 
treatment group; these conditions will lead to a lack of relia­
bility between raters. 
4. Bias will be prevented and reliability of the ratings will be 
preserved when the raters know the reliability of the items 
employed as well as which subjects are experimental and control. 
5. Bias will not be evident in the highly reliable items; these 
items will not be influenced by any of the conditions of the ex­
periment. 
This study has attempted to demonstrate the presence of observer bias 
in three areas. Conceivably, observer bias would occur when raters 1) dif­
fer in the reliability with which they rate members of two treatment 
groups, 2) use preferential ratings for particular individuals within a 
single treatment group, and 3) rate individuals from two treatment groups 
differently, that is, assign suppressed ratings for the nonpreferred group 
or increase the values assigned to the preferred group. 
It was suggested above that raters might differentially rate the mem­
bers of the two patient groups with respect to the reliability of the 
ratings. That is, they might rate persons within the preferred treatment 
group alike and, conversely, rate members from the nonpreferred treatment 
group as divergent. This might not be apparent in a comparison of the 
means of the groups but would be reflected by comparing the inter-rater 
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reliability with which the two groups were rated. This form of bias might 
or might not affect the means of the groups but would have an effect upon 
the variance, thereby affecting conclusions based on statistical tests 
using an estimate of the variance in the denominator. As the F-test per­
formed on the reliability estimates for the rater pairs in the present 
study failed to demonstrate differences in the reliability of the rater 
pairs either between or within treatment groups, one must conclude that 
this form of observer bias was not operating in the present study. 
A second way in which raters could bias data would be in biasing their 
ratings for particular individuals within a treatment group. They could 
conceivably increase or decrease the means for that group thereby increasing 
or decreasing the correction factor used in calculating the sum of squares 
for a test based upon that group. However, if this were done, the correla­
tions between the biasing rater and himself would be greater across methods 
than the correlations between himself and other raters and should yield a 
correlation coefficient exceeding the reliability of the item used for the 
rating. Had this form of bias occurred in the present study, it would have 
been reflected in the trait-method matrix for each treatment group by show­
ing discriminant validity for the biasing rater. As the matrices showed 
only method variance, the possibility of this type of biasing having oc­
curred in the present study is ruled out. 
The most blatant form which observer bias could take would be one in 
which a rater systematically increased or decreased his ratings for indi­
viduals within his preferred or nonpreferred treatment group. Such a pro­
cedure would have obvious effects upon any conclusions drawn about group 
differences. Had such systematic biasing occurred in the present study. 
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the trait-method matrices for the combined treatment groups would have 
shown discriminative validity for those raters who were biasing in this 
fashion, i.e., they would have tended to systematically assign the persons 
from their preferred group scores above their mean rating for all items. 
In this case the raters' correlations with themselves across items would 
have exceeded the reliability of the nonreliable items and would have ex­
ceeded the correlations with other raters both within and between item sets 
(methods). This did not occur in the present study. 
In view of the failure to find bias in the present study. Hypothesis 1, 
that bias will occur when staff members familiar with the patient assign­
ment to treatments rated the groups, must be rejected. The four raters who 
had worked with the treatment groups did not bias their ratings by using 
differential reliability for the patient groups, by assigning preferential 
ratings to individuals within a single group or by assigning preferential 
ratings to patients from either treatment group. 
Hypothesis 2, that the bias will be limited to items having low relia­
bility, must also be rejected. In the present study data for items with 
inter-rater reliability as low as .20 were analyzed. If biasing were shown 
to occur on items below this level, that finding, although interesting, 
would have little bearing upon the behavior modification controversy. The 
reliability of the measures customarily applied would exceed this level of 
reliability. 
Had the raters who were familiar with the purpose of the present study 
but unfamiliar with the patient assignment to treatment group shown less 
reliability than the other raters, this would have been apparent in the 
F-test on the reliability coefficients. These raters would have shown 
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consistent low reliability both within and between treatment groups. There 
was no indication that there was a difference between raters in the relia­
bility with which they assigned ratings; Hypothesis 3 does not seem tenable. 
The fourth hypothesis, which was worded to specify the conditions 
under which the two individuals who were fully aware of the conditions of 
the study were rating, cannot be rejected. However, the failure to reject 
this hypothesis results from the failure to create bias and not upon the 
specific conditions under which the ratings were made. The knowledge of 
the reliability of an item apparently has no effect upon the likelihood 
that the item will be biased if raters who do not have this knowledge also 
fail to bias the values they assign to patients. 
The fifth hypothesis, that high reliability items will show no rater 
bias, certainly seems acceptable. However, in light of the present study 
it seems that the definition of high reliability could, so far as being 
biasable is concerned, be somewhere in the .20 range. Stated bluntly, the 
reliability of the item cannot be a predictor of the biasability of that 
item if no items can be shown to be biasable. 
In summary, as it was impossible to demonstrate the presence of rater 
bias in any form, the last four hypotheses become either untestable or ir­
relevant. It will be recalled that in the Rationale and Procedure chapter 
of the present study four subgoals were established for the present re­
search. They were: 1) to determine if observer bias would be obtained in 
a behavioral setting, 2) to attempt a rudimentary scale to estimate the 
reliability required to prevent bias from occurring, 3) to study the rela­
tionship between knowledge of the conditions of the experiment and rater 
bias, and 4) to demonstrate a technique for assessing observer bias. 
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In view of the surprising finding that it was not possible to demon­
strate observer bias, the first of these goals has been accomplished. 
The second goal, that of constructing a scale to estimate the relia­
bility required to prevent observer bias, becomes unnecessary. The raters 
either assigned zero variance to items having a low reliability, thereby 
rejecting the item as differentiating between subjects, or used the item 
without signs of bias. The goal of establishing a scale to estimate the 
reliability required to prevent bias is thus unnecessary. As mentioned 
earlier, the raters did not bias items with reliability as low as .20. The 
likelihood of a researcher in a behavioral setting employing items of less 
reliability is highly unlikely. The number of items the raters assigned 
zero variance further suggests if one were to attempt to use less reliable 
items than those analyzed in this study, the raters would virtually refuse 
the item by assigning the same score to all subjects. 
Despite the occurrence of terms such as "temper tantrums" in the lit­
erature, one would probably not be led astray if he concluded that the re­
liability with which observers could judge the presence or absence of such 
behavior would either exceed or equal the reliability of some of the items 
used in the present study or be rejected by the raters. 
The final subgoal of the study was to demonstrate a technique for 
assessing observer bias. The flexibility of the assessment method for deal­
ing with at least three possible forms of bias has been demonstrated. 
The failure of the present study to demonstrate observer bias could 
have occurred as a result of the raters in the key group (W) having sensed 
that their ratings would be compared to those obtained from the other 
raters. As the four raters forming the wise and double wise groups were 
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the only non-Ph.D raters in the group, this could have exerted some unknown 
effect which might have prevented the bias from occurring. However, had 
this occurred there is no reason to believe the effect would be limited to 
this study. In other words, the same effect would be predicted whenever 
Ph.D. and non-Ph.D. raters were rating the same patients and, if used as a 
criticism of the present study, would not provide grounds for rejecting any 
study employing both Ph.D. and non-Ph.D. raters as free of observer bias. 
As both the wise and double wise raters in the present study were ex­
pecting publication as a result of their work, one could suggest that this 
prevented the bias by establishing a set or demand that the raters be overly 
objective. However, this is a description of any experimenter evaluating 
his work, and, again, if used as a criticism of the present study must not 
be used as a rationale for criticizing studies where the experimenter ex­
pects gain from his work. 
Another possibility would be that the rater pairs "guessed" the infor­
mation that would have given them the same knowledge as raters from another 
pair. Statements written on the final rating sheet describing the purpose 
of the ratings indicate that the raters had only the information pertinent 
to their group and did not have the information which would have placed them 
in another group. 
A final possibility would be that the four raters forming the wise 
groups were unique in that they were of superior "moral character" and 
would not, even unintentionally, bias their ratings. If this were the case, 
future researchers should have little difficulty in demonstrating this. 
A final word about observer bias in the form of response sets is appro­
priate. By referring to the matrices used for determining rater reliability 
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between patient groups, one may find values on the validity diagonal which 
show trait-discrimination. This is evidence of a response set and indicates 
the rater is not differentiating between the people he is rating. Inspec­
tion of the two matrices in Appendix III show examples of this. 
The primary purpose of the study was to examine the role observer bias 
played in the behavioral modification controversy. It will be recalled 
from the review of the literature that the behavior researcher has been 
criticized on two main points. The first criticism is sampling bias, i.e., 
the subjects have either been selected because of a specific behavior which 
fit the behavioral model, have not been selected by an individual other 
than the experimenter, or have, in the few studies demonstrating sufficient 
control for sampling, been "normal". Second, there have been criticisms 
that the literature is open to rater bias because the individuals who were 
evaluating the subjects were either aware of the treatment the individuals 
were receiving or had been involved directly with the treatment that was 
being provided or were members of the client's family or the hospital 
staff. 
It should be clear that in this study the patients being evaluated 
were: 1) randomly assigned to treatment groups, and 2) composed of chronic 
mental patients. It should also be clear that there were ratings on these 
patients by persons who were: 1) hospital personnel, 2) involved with the 
treatment program, thereby 3) aware of which subjects belonged to the dif­
ferent treatment groups. These ratings were compared with ratings by; 1) 
nonhospital personnel, who 2) were not involved with the treatment program, 
thereby 3) not aware of which subjects belonged to the different treatment 
groups. 
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From the results of this study it is appropriate to say that, despite 
the lack of studies safeguarding against the possibility of observer bias, 
it is doubtful that such bias has exerted influence on the data obtained. 
A reader in the area of behavior modification need not feel overly con­
cerned by the failure of the behavior researchers to control for observer 
bias by allowing the experimenter, or a member of his hospital staff, to 
evaluate the patient. 
It would seem advisable that the criticism of behavior modification 
literature as being plagued with observer bias (Breger and McGaugh, 1965; 
1966) be terminated unless or until the critics demonstrate a set of opera­
tions capable of eliciting observer bias. 
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APPENDIX I: RATING SCALE 
RATE THE APPLICANT ON THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ON A RANGE OF 0 TO 9 ACCORDING TO 
HOW WELL THE ITEMS DESCRIBE THE PERSON. ZERO MEANS THE ITEM DOES NOT DE­
SCRIBE THE APPLICANT AT ALL WHILE NINE MEANS THE ITEM IS HIGHLY DESCRIPTIVE 
OF THE PER.SON 
1. Comfortable 
2. Relaxed 
3. Asks questions of employer 
4. Tangential in answering questions 
5. Directed himself to raters rather than interviewer 
6. Appropriate tone in introduction 
7. Initiated introduction before the interviewer did 
8. Dressed neatly 
9. Answered questions too briefly 
10. Did not conclude interview before leaving 
11. Avoids reference to his psychiatric stay at hospital 
12. Specifies that he has references 
13. Volunteers release of information where appropriate 
14. Asks for a job 
15. Had to be asked if he would like a job 
16. Specified what skills he has or does not have 
17. Not enough eye-contact 
18. Hard to get rid of at the end of the interview 
19. Hard to keep his attention 
20. Changed subject to non-relevant topic 
21. Offered application form right away 
22. Had no idea of who to use for reference 
23. Inappropriate laughter 
24. Makes excuses inappropriately 
25. Suggests he can't handle the job before knowing what it entails 
26. Excessive body movement 
27. Excessive leg movement 
28. Hard to hear (interviewer had trouble hearing him) 
29. Louder than appropriate 
30. Unclear speech even though loud enough 
31. Made inappropriate personal comments or questions to interviewer or 
raters 
32. Did not take to actual role or did not understand role 
33. Appears motivated 
34. Personality appears intact 
35. Appropriate affect (emotional expression) 
36. High ego strength 
37. Tendency to employ magical thinking 
38. Expressed paranoid ideas 
39. Controlled delusional system during interview 
40. Ego integrated 
41. Demonstrates thinking disorder 
42. Cognitive consistency demonstrated 
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43. Achievement oriented 
44. Regressed 
45. High self-concept 
46. Reacts to interviewer as a father figure 
47. Involved in task 
48. Sick talk 
49. Finger drumming 
50. Stuttering 
51. High nervous tension 
52. Paranoid looking 
53. Reality oriented 
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APPENDIX II: INSTRUCTIONS 
Please do not discuss your ratings or the items with the other raters. 
Rate the following items according to how well they describe the person in 
the interview situation. Use the numbers 0 through 9 where 0 means the 
item is a very poor description of the person and 9 is a very good descrip­
tion of the person. Place your choice on the IBM answer sheets. (Please 
use a #2 pencil) 
Please note: Item 25 should be counted during the interview. The 
other items should be rated during the interview or immediately after. 
Ratings should be completed in five minutes from the time the interviewee 
comes in the room. 
1. Dressed neatly 
2. Eye-contact 
3. Comfortable 
4. Hard to hear (interviewer had trouble hearing him) 
5. Hard to keep his attention 
6. Appropriate affect 
7. Nervousness impairs performance 
8. Regressed 
9. Ego integrated 
10. Reacts to interviewer as a father figure 
11. Uses sick talk 
12. Finger drumming 
13. Changed subject to non-relevant topic 
14. Inappropriate laughter 
15. Excessive leg movement 
16. Appears motivated 
17. Louder than appropriate 
18. Personality appears intact 
19. Expressed paranoid ideas 
20. Demonstrates thinking disorder 
21. High self-concept 
22. Makes inappropriate excuses 
23. Made inappropriate personal comments or questions 
24. High ego strength 
25 Number of questions asked 
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APPENDIX III: TWO EXAMPLES OF RESPONSE SET BY RATERS 
Practice Group Lecture Group 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
1 
70 1 
(U 
u 
81 78 1 
45 70 75 1 
U 
<0 h 
PM 
80 63 85 47 1 
-36 -46 -30 11 -37 1 
92 77 92 71 76 -14 1 
84 75 91 67 94 -37 84 
-32 -48 -59 -22 -40 34 -45 -28 1 
-17 -37 -33 -48 16 24 -31 -11 21 1 
(U 22 56 28 -01 01 29 43 28 17 -44 1 
S 00 41 -03 -07 -79 -14 07 01 -42 11 1 
% 05 -41 -32 -31 -42 09 -10 -29 52 -33 -05 -01 1 
21 -47 -11 -55 23 -10 -07 08 30 46 -68 -30 45 1 
11 27 07 24 38 -21 00 45 50 30 26 36 -27 06 1 
-29 09 41 20 -63 45 -19 -38 61 -39 71 13 45 -43 06 
1 
-25 
(U 43 54 1 
•t>| 
-10 73 37 1 
S 36 04 60 04 1 
03 61 59 03 29 1 
85 -09 68 12 47 -03 
-40 80 11 70 -35 19 -31 
-69 06 -21 -31 03 08 -56 17 1 
-48 17 11 -22 42 28 -28 -07 80 1 
(U 
-40 27 -01 13 34 -03 -26 34 74 73 1 
3 4J 04 43 51 34 21 00 42 31 23 41 51 1 
o (U -49 -03 -15 12 31 -34 -28 20 67 48 77 19 I 
10 
-76 -21 -74 32 -27 12 -92 19 39 -03 -12 08 1 
-41 -13 02 -16 13 -14 -16 09 68 34 41 12 76 13 
-31 38 00 15 01 10 -28 64 32 77 36 60 -45 
